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RECENT CASE NOTES
BROKES-COMMISSION-WHEN EARNED-Defendant, in consideration of
one dollar, gave plaintiff, a real estate broker, an option to sell a lot. The
contract gave plaintiff the exclusive right to sell the property within thirty
days for $3,675 cash, at a fixed commission. Plaintiff entered into nego-
tiations with the board of school commissioners of Indianapolis and within
the time allowed they proposed in writing to buy the property, and pay
$3,900 in cash, as soon as bonds were sold by them with the approval of
the State Board of Tax Commissioners. Defendant contended that this
was not a proper acceptance of his offer, and refused to make the sale as
proposed. Later, after the expiration of the thirty day period, the school
commissioners condemned, paying $7,000. There was no evidence that any
fraud was practiced upon plaintiff. Plaintiff brings this action to recover
his commission for the sale of the property. From a judgment for the
defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held, sustained. "Before the appellant would
be entitled to recover in this action, he must show that he procured a pur-
chaser within thirty days, who within said time was ready and willing to
pay unconditionally the amount of the purchase price of said real estate."1
The court undoubtedly correctly decided the case, as under the circum-
stances the condemnation proceedings could hardly be called a "sale"
within the meaning of the contract and the procuring of the proposal of
the school commissioners, it being conditional, could hardly of itself have
been sufficient performance to entitle plaintiff to a commission. But, is
the above quotation a correct statement of the law? Is it necessary that
the broker find a purchaser who is willing to pay the purchase price within
the time stipulated? There is great confusion in the cases upon this point.
In Cole v. Crump2 the court held that if the agent initiated the trans-
action of purchase within the time prescribed, and might therefore be re-
garded as the procuring cause, it is immaterial that the parties did not
reach an agreement within that time. In Ewan v. Power,3 it was also
held that where a broker introduces a customer, within the period fixed by
the proposal, to whom a sale is made after the expiration of that time, he
is entitled to his commission. The argument that the court advanced in
that case was that after taking advantage of the broker's services the
seller was estopped from setting up the expiration of the stipulated period.
The result of these cases has been reached by a number of courts. Some
of them have allowed the broker to have the commission designated, while
others have only allowed a recovery upon a quantum meruit basis.4
Other courts, unwilling to go so far but not wishing to hold brokers
to the strictest construction of the proposal, have held that the procuring
within the given time of a customer ready, able and willing to buy if given
a reasonable time in which to examine title is sufficient performance to
entitle the broker to his commission. 5
The rule laid down by the Indiana court is, however, supported by
many decisions. That is they hold that the customer must be able and
C Uonley v. Brummit, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 1, 1931, 176 X. E. 880.
2174 Mo. A. 215, 156 S. W. 769.
S165 Ky. 806, 178 S. W. 1092.
'Jaeger v. Glover, 89 Minn. 490, 95 N. W. 311; Griswald v. Pierce, 86 Ill. A.
406; Goffe v. Gibson, 18 Mo. A. 1; Southworth v. Swavienskl, 99 N. Y. S. 1079.
5Watson v. Brooks, 13 Fed. 540.
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willing to pay the purchase price before the expiration of the period given
in which to effect the sale.6 The cases of Brown v. Northha mpton, Eastern,
etc., R. R.,7 and Broum v. Masons illustrate the application of the same
principle to situations involving other types of brokers.
An analysis of the relationship involved in the situation under discus-
sion, and a study of the legal principles applicable, will lead to the con-
clusion that the rule stated by the Indiana court and in the cases last
cited is a correct statement of the law. There are two sorts of relation-
ships which exist between the owners of land and brokers. Sometimes an
owner merely authorizes a broker to sell his property, promising to pay a
commission if he performs, while in other cases, as in Conley v. Brumit,
the broker is given the exclusive right to sell and pays a consideration for
it. Where the relationship first pointed out exists there is no contract at
all, for the broker has given no consideration for the owner's promise.
What the seller actually does is to make an offer. When this offer is
accepted it will ripen into a unilateral contract, which may be defined as
"a contract created by a promise on one side given for an act other than
a promise on the other side."9 Where the broker pays a consideration for
the promise of the other to give him a certain time in which to negotiate
the sale, the consideration only goes to the promise to hold the proposi-
tion open, and the real effect is only to change the offer into an irrevocable
one.'
0 Thus it seems that where one procures a broker to sell property
for him, what he actually does is only to make an offer. Since he is under
no obligation to make an offer, an offeror can dictate any terms he sees
fit. When he requires that acceptance be within a certain time, if it is
not within that time the offer necessarily expires." In the absence of
express instructions to complete a sale, the majority of the courts hold
that when the word "sell" is used in empowering a real estate agent, it
means to "procure a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy upon terms
specified by or acceptable to the principal."' 2 To accept the offer made by
the owner, then, a broker must produce a purchaser ready to buy. There-
fore, the conclusion which we must reach, since to accept one must find
a purchaser ready to buy, and since acceptance must be within the time
specified, is that the Indiana court correctly stated the law when it said
that to entitle himself to his commission, a broker must "show that he has
procured a purchaser within the specified period, who within said time was
ready and willing to pay unconditionally the amount of the purchase price
of said real estate." W.H.H.
' Among these cases are Barney v. Yazoo Delta Land Co., 179 Ind. 337, 101 N. E.
96 (quoted in the principal case) ; Fultz v. Wi~mer, 34 Kan. 576, 9 Pac. 316; and
Hurst v. Williams, 31 Ky. L. 658, 102 S. W. 1176.
7110 C. C. A. 193, 200 Fed. 897.
' 155 Cal. 155, 99 Pac. 867.
9 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, p. 41.
1o Williston, Contracts, Sec. 61, Vol. 1, p. 106.
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Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334.
12Davis v. Clausen, 2 Ala. App. 378, 57 S. 79; Stemler v. Bass, 153 Cal. 791,
96 Pac. 809; McDonald v. Smith, 99 Minn. 42, 108 N. W. 291; Manker v. Tough,
79 Kan. 46, 89 Pac. 792.
